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Abstract
We introduce a new combinatorial auction format based on a simple, trans-
parent pricing mechanism tailored for the hierarchical package structure proposed
by Rothkopf, Pekecˇ, and Harstad (1998) to avoid computational complexity. This
combination provides the feedback necessary for bidders in multi-round auctions
to discern winning bidding strategies for subsequent rounds and to coordinate re-
sponses to aggressive package bids. The resulting mechanism is compared to two
leading alternatives in a series of laboratory experiments involving varying degrees
of value synergies. Based on these “wind tunnel” tests the FCC has decided to use
hierarchical package bidding in the major upcoming 700MHz auction.
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1. Introduction
Auctions with multiple items are typically conducted in an environment in which bid-
ders’ values depend on acquiring combinations, e.g. networks of broadcast licenses or
timber rights for adjacent tracts of land. Concerns for economic efficiency and revenue
enhancement have led the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to run auctions
simultaneously for large numbers of licenses in a series of bidding rounds, with provisional
winners being announced after each round. Under the simultaneous multi-round auction
format (SMR), the highest bid on each license becomes the provisional price that must
be topped in a subsequent round. This approach has been copied in other countries with
considerable success, but experimental evidence indicates that efficiency and revenue may
be reduced when bidders hesitate to incorporate synergy values into their bids for fear that
they will end up winning only part of a desired package (see, for instance, the references
in Brunner et al., 2007).
The “exposure problem” is a major concern in what is arguably the auction of a
lifetime, i.e. the upcoming FCC 700MHz spectrum auction.1 This spectrum has better
propagation and penetration properties than any spectrum sold before and is extremely
valuable for wireless applications (the FCC has set minimum prices at over 10 billion).
More importantly, the wireless industry is concentrated and the 700MHz auction provides
the last opportunity for a new firm to enter the market. For an entrant to be successful in
the wireless market, however, it has to acquire a nationwide footprint, which is virtually
impossible with the current SMR format because of exposure risk.
Some pre-packaging of licenses into larger groups may help solve the exposure problem.
In FCC Auction 65, for example, bids were proportionally higher for large blocks of
bandwidth for air-to-ground communications; a block with 3 times as much bandwidth
as a smaller block sold for about 4.5 times as much. In Auction 66 that closed in the
fall of 2006, a 20MHz band divided into over 700 local areas sold for 2.27 billion dollars,
but the same amounts of bandwidth sold for 2.45 billion when divided into 176 regions,
and for 4.17 billion when divided into 12 regions. Of course, pre-packaging generally
disadvantages small bidders who might be part of an optimal allocation due to incumbency
or efficient local operations. Instead of dividing licenses into large or small groups, there
may be considerable gains in allowing competition that determines the packages, e.g.
between bidders on individual licenses, regional groups, and a single national license. A
combinatorial auction solves this problem by allowing bids on packages of various sizes
1The 700MHz spectrum has been coined the “FCC’s crown jewels” by FCC commissioner Adelstein
and is more generally referred to as “beach front property.” According to former FCC chief of staff Blair
Levin, “...the 700MHz auction will be the biggest spectrum auction ever held.”
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and letting the bidding competition determine the market structure.
There are two steps to be done after each round of a combinatorial auction: (i) the
determination of provisional winners or “assignment” part, (ii) and the information pro-
vision or “pricing” part. The assignment part, which involves finding the non-overlapping
bids that maximize seller revenue, is easy to explain but NP-hard (non-deterministic
polynomial-time hard) to do. The number of possible allocations grows exponentially,
and with many objects for sale there is no guarantee the best allocation is found in a
reasonable amount of time – this is commonly referred to as the computational complex-
ity problem. The problem is manageable in the sense that the computer can run for
a fixed amount of time and the best solution at that point can be chosen. Then this
solution can be used as a lower bound from where next round’s solution can be found
(“branch-and-bound”). However, some experts claim they can “wreck any combinatorial
auction with enough licenses” by abusing computational issues. In any case, bidders will
not be able to reproduce the outcome of a round to understand why their bids did not
win, unless they solve an NP-hard problem quickly. Approximations must be particularly
worrisome for public officials who anticipate that losing bidders may later complain about
the assignments and prices in a particular round.
Rothkopf, Pekecˇ, and Harstad (1998) propose a type of “hierarchical” pre-packaging to
avoid computational issues in combinatorial auctions. In this approach, there are several
hierarchy levels of varying package sizes. For instance, if there are only three levels then
the lowest could contain individual licenses, the middle level could contain non-overlapping
regional packages, and the highest level could contain the national package. With this tree
structure, the revenue maximization problem is recursive and can be solved in a linear
manner, since revenue-maximizing “winners” at one level can be compared with those at
the next level up in the hierarchy.
This paper proposes and tests a simple pricing formula for hierarchical combinatorial
auctions. If a bid on an individual license is provisionally winning, then that bid would
become the price for the license, as is the case for SMR. The idea underlying the pricing
is that prices for individual licenses would have to be scaled up by lump-sum “taxes”
to share the burden of unseating a provisionally winning package bid. For example, if
a bid on a regional package is provisionally winning, prices for individual licenses would
be increased so that bidders on individual licenses in that region would know how high
they have to bid to unseat the provisional regional winner. In this sense, prices help
these bidders solve a coordination or “threshold problem,” since each would prefer that
someone else bear the cost of unseating the package bid.
The key feature of the proposed mechanism is that the resulting license prices are
composed of intuitive and easy to compute components that match the transparency of
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the recursive revenue-maximizing allocation rule. These simple hierarchical allocation
and pricing rules are the basis for the “hierarchical package bidding” (HPB) format that
the FCC will use for the upcoming 700MHz auction. In the Procedures Public Notice
(October 5, 2007) the FCC motivates their choice as follows “... we will use HPB in part
because the mechanism for calculating prices is significantly simpler than other package
bidding formats...”2
Even though a simple tree structure with hierarchical package bidding provides straight-
forward price indicators for how high bids on individual licenses and packages must be to
“get into the action,” there is a concern that the definitions of non-overlapping packages
at each level may not match the interests of particular bidders. For example, suppose
that a bidder has super-additive values for multiple licenses that are not spanned by a
particular regional package definition. In this case, package bidding does not fully protect
from exposure risk, and the “second-best” nature of the constraints added by hierarchical
package bidding may result in lower rather than higher revenues and efficiencies. This
possibility motivated the laboratory experiments to be discussed below. For purposes of
comparison, we also consider the SMR format currently used by the FCC, and a fully
flexible auction format that does not restrict package bids that can be submitted. This
fully flexible format is a version of the FCC’s Modified Package Bidding (MPB) that uses
the Resource Allocation Design (RAD) pricing mechanism proposed by Kwasnica et al.
(2005).3 RAD prices are essentially approximations to shadow prices determined by the
dual of a constrained revenue-maximization problem, as explained in more detail below.
In the next section we provide a general description of the assignment and pricing rules
for auctions with hierarchically pre-defined packages. Section 3 discusses the experiment
design and procedures. Section 4 provides aggregate statistics on efficiency, revenue,
and bidder profits for the three auction formats. Section 5 contains a discussion of the
exposure problem we observe in the SMR format and the threshold problem that occurs
with flexible package bidding. In spectrum auctions, it is often the case that licenses
that cover different blocks of spectrum within the same geographic region are viewed
as substitutes while licenses that cover different regions are viewed as complements. In
section 6, we present results for two additional experiments based on related designs with
a mix of substitutes and complements. Section 7 concludes. A summary data table can
be found in the Appendix.
2See http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-07-4171A1.pdf. The specific
pricing and assignment rules are described in Appendix H. An earlier FCC Public Notice that invited
feedback about our mechanism mentions the importance of the experiments and the relative success
of HPB, see http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-07-3415A1.pdf. We would
like to stress that the HPB format resulted from independent research. We designed the auction prior to
proposing it to the FCC who responded by asking us to test it in the lab.
3The MPB experiments reported below employ the RAD design described by Kwasnica et al. (2005).
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2. Simple Combinatorial Assignment and Pricing
The hierarchical structures considered here can be formed by repeatedly breaking up larger
packages into smaller ones. For example, the top level could consist of a single nationwide
package, which is divided into smaller regional packages at the second level, which in turn
contain many individual licenses belonging to the first level. More generally, let there
be H ≥ 1 hierarchy levels, labeled by h = 1, · · · , H, where level h contains Ih packages.
The lowest level contains the smallest units, e.g. individual licenses, and higher levels
consist of bigger packages. Level-h packages are denoted P hih for ih = 1, · · · , Ih and cover
αhih bidding units (e.g. population times bandwidth). The number of packages within a
hierarchy falls as we go up in the hierarchy tree, i.e. Ih′ ≤ Ih for h′ ≥ h. Packages within
a hierarchy are non-overlapping, i.e. for level-h packages P hih 6= P hjh we have P hih ∩P hjh = ∅.
Furthermore, a package from a lower hierarchy level is contained in exactly 1 package from
each of the higher levels, i.e. for each P hih and for each h
′ > h there is a unique level-h′
package P h
′
jh′
such that P h
′
jh′
⊃ P hih . The number of bidding units covered by a package
equals the number of bidding units covered by the level-1 items it contains∑
P 1i1
⊂Phih
α1i1 = α
h
ih
. (1)
In particular, each hierarchy level covers the entire nation:
∑Ih
ih=1
αhih = α for each level
h = 1, · · · , H, with α the total number of bidding units in the nation.
The combinatorial auction with hierarchically structured packages is “simple” in the
sense that the assignment problem can be solved in a linear manner. First, for each
hierarchy level h, we find the highest bids on the packages within the hierarchy. Let these
best bids be denoted by bmax(P hih). To find the optimal assignment and revenue we follow
a recursive algorithm, defining revenues R(P hih) for packages of all levels.
1. Set h = 1 and define revenues for packages in this level to be R(P 1i1) = b
max(P 1i1) for
i1 = 1, · · · , I1. Furthermore, label these high bids “provisionally winning.”
2. If h < H, increase h by 1 and do step 3, otherwise quit.
3. If bmax(P hih) >
∑
Ph−1ih−1⊂P
h
ih
R(P h−1ih−1), where the sum is over all level-(h− 1) packages
contained in P hih , then R(P
h
ih
) = bmax(P hih) and b
max(P hih) is labeled provisionally win-
ning and bids from all lower levels on packages that overlap with P hih are unmarked.
Otherwise, R(P hih) =
∑
Ph−1ih−1⊂P
h
ih
R(P h−1ih−1). Return to step 2.
By construction, the maximum revenue is the sum of revenues for items in the top level,
R =
∑IH
iH=1
R(PHiH ), and the provisionally winning bids are those that are still marked
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after the algorithm finishes. Note that the total number of comparisons is linear in the
number of predefined packages.
Prices are assigned to the smallest possible objects, i.e. objects in the lowest hierarchy
level. The main idea is to match the recursive approach of the assignment part and add
a “tax” to level-1 prices (proportional to the number of bidding units covered) if the
revenue of a lower level falls short of that of the next level up. This tax is such that for
every hierarchy level, h, the best revenue R(P hih) associated with a level-h package P
h
ih
can
be obtained by summing the prices of the level-1 packages contained in P hih . A fortiori,
summing the prices of all level-1 packages yields the best possible revenue. Let p(P 1i1)
denote the price of level-1 package P 1i1 .
1. Set h = 1 and define prices for packages in this level to be p(P 1i1) = b
max(P 1i1) for
i1 = 1, · · · , I1.
2. If h < H, increase h by 1 and do step 3, otherwise quit.
3. For each level-h package P hih , add τ
h(P 1i1) =
α1i1
αhih
(
R(P hih)−
∑
Ph−1ih−1⊂P
h
ih
R(P h−1ih−1)
) ≥ 0
to the price p(P 1i1) of each level-1 package P
1
i1
contained in P hih . Return to step 2.
The recursive algorithms used to determine prices and allocations are similar and could
be combined to run simultaneously after each round of the auction. Furthermore, they
are trivial from a computational viewpoint.
The level-1 prices that result from this recursive approach can be neatly summarized
as:
p(P 1i1) = b
max(P 1i1) +
∑
Phih
⊃P 1i1
α1i1
αhih
(
R(P hih) −
∑
Ph−1ih−1⊂P
h
ih
R(P h−1ih−1)
)
, (2)
where the (outer) sum is over all higher-level packages that contain P 1i1 . There is exactly
one such package at each higher level, so the sum contains a single term for each h > 1,
which is the level-h tax τh(P 1i1), defined above. The right-side of (2) is therefore equal
to a “base price” augmented with non-negative taxes: p(P 1i1) = b
max(P 1i1) +
∑
h>1 τ
h(P 1i1).
This interpretation was used in the instructions phase of the experiments reported below.
Proposition. The prices defined in (2) have the following properties:
(i) Prices reduce to standard SMR prices in the absence of package bids. Taxes, if any,
are proportional to the number of bidding units covered.
(ii) Prices signal how high bids must be to unseat current winners at any hierarchy level.
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(iii) Prices are “market clearing,” i.e. the sum of individual license prices within a
package exceeds (equals) the amount of a losing (winning) bid for the package.
Proof. Without package bids R(P hih) =
∑
P 1i1
⊂Phih
bmax(P 1i1) for all packages P
h
ih
so (2) re-
duces to p(P 1i1) = b
max(P 1i1). To show (ii), define the level-h revenue R(h) =
∑Ih
ih=1
R(P hih).
Using (1), it is readily verified that the linear prices in (2) sum up to level-H revenues:
I1∑
i1=1
p(P 1i1) = R(1) +
∑
h>1
(R(h)−R(h− 1)) = R(H),
which is the maximum revenue by construction. Hence, prices of the level-1 items sum to
the winning bids, irrespective of the levels in which the winning bids occur. Property (iii)
follows by construction and reflects the fact that the assignment problem has an integer
solution, so dual prices exist. ¤
The proportional tax property in (i) ensures that small licenses do not get overpriced.4
The second property shows how the prices help smaller bidders avoid the “threshold”
problem that potentially occurs when they have to coordinate their bids in response to
an aggressive package bid. The third property does not generally hold with flexible (non-
hierarchical) package bidding.5
3. Experimental Design
3.1. Auction Formats
Our main design involves 7 bidders and 18 licenses, with three alternative auction formats.
All experiments were conducted using jAuctions, which enables bidders to create “custom”
packages in order to see the value complementarities associated with winning combinations
of licenses.6 Under flexible package bidding (MPB), bidders could bid on these self-created
4Consider a two-level hierarchy with 1 national package divided into three licenses, labeled A, B, and
C, which cover different bidding units: A and C are small (αA = αC = 1) while B is large (αB = 10).
Suppose that values for A and C are somewhere in the [5,20] range while the value for B is somewhere
in the [50,100] range. Furthermore, suppose there are three small bidders and one large bidder: bidder
1 wants A, bidder 2 wants B, and bidder 3 wants C, while bidder 4 values only the package ABC. If
opening bids of the small bidders are 4 on licenses A–C while bidder 4 places a bid of 60 on ABC
then without correcting for bidding units, prices are pA = pB = pC = 20. This would cause bidders
1 and 3 to drop out since their values are below 20. In other words, small licenses get over-priced,
thereby eliminating small bidders from the auction. In contrast, the pricing formula (2) yields prices of
pA = pC = 4+ 112 (60−12) = 8 and pB = 4+ 1012 (60− 12) = 44, giving small bidders a chance to compete.
5Consider, for example, the following four bids: bABC = 30 and bAB = bAC = bBC = 24. No market
clearing prices exist in this case.
6jAuctions is a JAVA-based suite of auction programs developed by Jacob Goeree.
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packages. Under the baseline simultaneous multi-round auction (SMR), these custom
packages would be shown but could not be placed into the bidding basket. Finally, under
hierarchical package bidding (HPB) bidders are permitted to submit bids for pre-defined
packages but not for custom packages.
Without package bidding (SMR), the highest bids submitted for each license in a round
become the provisionally winning bids. With package bidding (either MPB or HPB), the
provisionally winning bids for licenses or packages are those that maximize seller revenue.
At the end of each round, bidders receive information on all provisionally winning bids
(for licenses and packages) and the corresponding ID numbers. Bidders also see the prices
for all licenses, the sum of their own values for the licenses and packages that they are
provisionally winning, and the sum of prices that would be paid for those licenses and
packages if the auction had ended. Bidding continues from round to round until no new
bids are submitted (or withdrawn under SMR), at which time the provisionally winning
bids become the final bids that determine allocations and prices paid. Under SMR, bidders
have limited opportunities to withdraw provisionally winning bids: in at most two rounds
of the auction, bidders can withdraw as many provisionally winning bids as they wish.7
Withdrawals are subject to penalties that compensate the seller for lower prices obtained:
if the license is sold, the penalty is equal to the difference between the withdrawn bid and
the final sales price (if this difference is positive, otherwise the penalty is 0). If the license
goes unsold, the penalty is 25% of the withdrawn bid.
The bids in each round are used to construct prices that place lower bounds on the
bids that can be submitted in the subsequent round. Under SMR, prices are simply equal
to the highest bids for the licenses. Under MPB, the prices for licenses are set so that the
losing bids on licenses (or packages) are less than or equal to the corresponding license
prices (or sum of prices for individual licenses in that package) and the winning bids
are equal to the corresponding prices. Although the intuition behind these “Walrasian”
constraints is clear, the presence of complementarities in license values may preclude the
existence of such dual prices. In this case, prices are approximated in a manner that
minimizes some measure of the extent to which the constraints are not satisfied.8 As
shown in the previous section, HPB prices are Walrasian prices (not approximations).
These prices are computed in a straightforward recursive manner by scaling up high bids
at each level so that they sum to the high bid at the next level of the hierarchy.9
7Since package bidding protects bidders from the exposure problem, withdrawals were not permitted
under MPB and HPB.
8In addition, there may be multiple solutions to the constraints, and a second constrained optimization
problem is run to resolve the indeterminacy, e.g. maximizing the minimum price, or minimizing the sum
of squared deviations from previous round prices (Kwasnica et al., 2005).
9Under SMR, new and current provisionally winning bids are considered to determine provisional
winners for the next round. Under MPB and HPB all bids received are considered (to prevent cycles). Of
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New bids at the start of a round must exceed provisionally winning bids under SMR
by at least one bid increment (3 points in the experiment), whereas new bids under the
two package bidding formats must exceed the price of a license or sum of prices for licenses
in a package by at least one bid increment for each license in the package. For example,
the next bid on a package of 2 licenses with prices 5 and 10 would have to be 21 (= 5 +
10 + 3 + 3), but higher bids of 24, 27, etc. would also be allowed.10
In the FCC auctions, financial pre-qualifications determine initial bidding activities
for each participant, where activity is measured in terms of population and bandwidth
(“MHz-pop” units). Each license in the experiment has one activity unit to avoid the
extra complexity. Activity has a “use it or lose it” feature, except that a provisionally
winning bid does not need to be resubmitted to maintain activity. Therefore, activity
in this round is defined in terms of the number of different licenses for which a bidder
is the provisional winner or for which a bid is submitted in the previous round, either
individually or as part of a package. Under MPB and HPB, a bid from a previous round
which was not then a winning bid might become a winning bid later as a result of others’
bidding behavior. However, this does not raise a bidder’s activity. In other words, bidders’
activities can only decrease over the course of the auction. If a person’s bidding activity
is below the permitted level, then the permitted activity falls to that lower level in the
subsequent round.
3.2. Sessions and Bidder Interests
Each auction involved 7 participants: six “regional” bidders (labeled 1 through 6) and one
“national” bidder (labeled 7). A graphical representation of bidders’ interests is shown in
Figure 1. The large circle (licenses A through L) on the left contains licenses of interest to
the national and regional bidders. For example, license A is of interest to regional bidders
course, retaining old bids implies they may become winning at a later stage, and the FCC is considering
allowing bidders to “drop” non-provisionally winning bids in a single round. To maintain comparability
with SMR where regional bidders could win at most 4 licenses due to activity constraints we imposed
purchase limits of 4 for regional bidders, which were used in the revenue maximization routines in MPB
and TPB. These limits are absent when eligibility is determined by the number of licenses bidders register
for prior to the start of the auction, in which case revenue maximization follows from the simple recursive
structure described above. In the presence of purchase constraints, the computed HPB prices that
determine minimum bids for the next round may differ from current winning bids – the revenues reported
in this paper are based on bids submitted, not on computed prices.
10Under MPB, after a round in which news bids were submitted but revenue did not increase, the bid
increment needs to be raised to avoid cycling. Consider the following scenario where the bid increment
is assumed to be 3: suppose there is a winning bid of 30 on the ABC package and three other bids
of 29 on AB, AC, and BC. The computed prices for A, B, and C are 10 each. In the next round the
minimum acceptable bids are 26 (=10+10+3+3) for each package of two licenses. So the losing bidders
could resubmit their bids of 29, and minimum acceptable bids would again be 26 for each license etc.
This cycling behavior can occur whenever a package bid is winning and losing bidders are bidding on
sub-packages. The solution is to increase the bid increment (from 3 to 6 to 9, etc.).
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3, 44, 5
5, 6
1, 6
National Circle Regional Circle
F
C
D
E
G
HI
J
K
L
A
B
1, 2, 7
1, 2, 7
2, 3, 7
2, 3, 7
3, 4, 7
3, 4, 74, 5, 7
4, 5, 7
5, 6, 7
5, 6, 7
1, 6, 7
1, 6, 7
Figure 1. Regional bidders 1-6 are interested in 4 licenses from
the national circle and 2 licenses from the regional circle. National
bidder 7 is interested in all 12 licenses from the national circle.
1 and 6 and to the national bidder 7. Note that each regional bidder has an interest in 4
adjacent licenses, with partial overlap in these interests. The smaller circle on the right
(licenses M through R) contains licenses only of interest to regional bidders, e.g. license
P is of interest to regional bidders 3 and 4. Activity and purchase limits were such that
regional bidders can acquire at most four licenses, and the national bidder can acquire
up to twelve licenses on the larger circle. One useful feature of the smaller circle was to
reduce earnings inequities in cases where the national bidder managed to win a national
license or a large share of licenses, which was expected to happen more frequently with
package bidding.
The license values for each bidder were randomly determined, and values for combina-
tions were determined by scaling up the values of the individual licenses in the combina-
tion. For the national bidder, the baseline draw distributions are uniform on the range [0,
10] for licenses A-D and I-L and uniform on the range [0, 20] for licenses E-H. For regional
bidders, the baseline draw distributions are uniform on the range [0, 20] for licenses A-D
and I-L and uniform on the range [0, 40] for licenses E-H. Finally, for licenses M-R the
baseline draw distributions are uniform on the range [0, 20]. These value distributions
(not the actual draws) were common knowledge among the bidders. Note that the E-H
region of the national circle is, on average, worth more to the national and regional bid-
ders. This asymmetry allows us to measure the impact of “pre-packaging” on regional
bidders of different strengths. In particular, the regional bidder with an interest in the
high-value licenses E-H would often be a strong competitor with the national bidder,
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and a threshold problem could arise if the other regional bidders drop out of the bidding
without coordinating a strong response to an aggressive national bid.
In all formats, bidders could bid on individual licenses. Recall that bidders cannot bid
on packages under SMR, and they have full flexibility in bidding on packages under MPB,
subject to activity constraints. Under HPB, the admissible packages have a hierarchical
structure consisting of a single national package ABCDEFGHIJKL in our HPB2 design,
where the subscript indicates the number of levels in the hierarchy. We also implemented
a three-level hierarchy, with an additional middle level consisting of three non-overlapping
regional packages: ABCD, EFGH, and IJKL in our HPB3-odd design and ABKL, CDEF,
and GHIJ in our HPB3-even design, see Table 1 (licenses E, F, G, and H are shown in
bold to indicate their higher values). In other words, in HPB3-odd the odd numbered
regional bidders can bid on their preferred packages but not the even numbered bidders,
while in HPB3-even the reverse is true. In HPB2, regional bidders could only submit bids
for individual licenses, while the national bidder could bid on individual licenses and/or
on the national package.11 Each of these 5 treatments was replicated 5 times as indicated
in Table 1, for a total of 25 sessions (using different groups of 7 participants in each
session). For each replication or “wave,” we generated new sets of random values for all
the bidders; we used the same sets of values across auction formats to reduce performance
differences due to the random draws.
Value complementarities were chosen so that the optimal allocation would involve a
single national package on the large circle for some sets of value draws and a combination
11The hierarchy structures employed in the experiment simplified the explanation of the HPB pricing
rule. Consider, for example, the three-level hierarchy used in HPB3-odd and HPB3-even. Let the 12
items on the national circle be indexed by r = 1, · · · , 3 to denote the region and by i = 1, · · · , 4 to denote
a license within the region. Let bmaxir denote the best bid for license i in region r, b
max
r the best package
bid for region r, and bmax the best package bid for the nation-wide license. Define the revenue for region
r as Revr = max(bmaxr ,
∑4
i=1 b
max
ir ) and the national revenue as Rev = max(b
max,
∑3
r=1Revr). The price
pir of license i in region r is simply the maximum bid for the license plus possibly a “regional tax” (if
the sum of individual bids falls short of the regional profit) plus possibly a “national tax” (if the sum of
regional profits falls short of the national profit):
pir = bmaxir +
αir
αr
(
Revr −
4∑
i′=1
bmaxi′r
)
+
αir
α
(
Rev−
3∑
r′=1
Revr′
)
,
with αr =
∑4
i=1 αir the number of bidding units in region r and α =
∑3
r=1 αr the number of bidding
units nationwide. (For simplicity, each license covers αir = 1 bidding unit in the experiment.) As an
example, suppose the high bids are 3 on each of the 12 items, the regional bids are 24, and the national
bid is 84. In this case, the national bid is winning and prices for each of the items are the high bids plus
a regional and a national tax: 3+ 14 (24−4×3)+ 112 (84−3×24) = 7, which determines bids on each item
needed to unseat the winning national bid. Finally, for the two-level hierarchy used in HPB2 the above
pricing rule further simplifies to pi = bmaxi +
αi
α
(
Rev−∑12i′=1 bmaxi′ ), where i = 1, · · · , 12 now labels the
twelve licenses on the national circle. In other words, the price pi of license i is now simply the maximum
bid for the license plus possibly a “national tax.”
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Available License
# Groups Regional National Regional National Packages Synergy
SMR 5 6 (4) 1 (12) A-L, M-R A-L None 20%
HPB2 5 6 (4) 1 (12) A-L, M-R A-L ABCDEFGHIJKL 20%
HPB3-odd 5 6 (4) 1 (12) A-L, M-R A-L ABCD, EFGH, IJKL, ABCDEFGHIJKL 20%
HPB3-even 5 6 (4) 1 (12) A-L, M-R A-L CDEF, GHIJ, ABKL, ABCDEFGHIJKL 20%
MPB 5 6 (4) 1 (12) A-L, M-R A-L All 20%
# Bidders (Activity) Licenses
Table 1. Complementarities Design
of regional package awards and individual license awards in others. For both national and
regional bidders, each license acquired goes up in value by 20% (with two licenses), by 40%
(with three licenses), by 60% (with four licenses), etc., and by 220% if the national bidder
wins all twelve licenses A-L. In waves 1-4, complementarities occur among all licenses
while in wave 5 they occur only among licenses from the national circle. For example, if
bidder 1 wins the combination ABM, the value synergies apply to licenses A and B and
M in waves 1-4 and only to A and B in wave 5. The national bidder can acquire up to
twelve licenses and has value complementarities for all licenses in all five waves.
Participants were recruited from the Caltech student population for sessions that lasted
about an hour and a half. Including the experiments reported in section 6, we conducted
58 sessions using 340 subjects.12 Each session began with an instruction period and 3
practice auctions, followed by 6 auctions used to determine their earnings. The number
of auctions was announced in advance. Bidder roles were reassigned randomly after each
auction in order to attenuate earnings differences across national and regional bidders and
to help bidders understand the strategic considerations faced by both types of bidders.
Earnings were calculated by converting points to dollars at a rate of 2 points per dollar.
Average earnings were about $40 per person, including a $5 show-up fee, and payments
were made in cash immediately after the final auction.
4. Results: Aggregate Data
In this section we report the main indicators for auction performance: efficiency, revenues,
and bidders’ profits.
12The results for 20 of these sessions were submitted to the FCC in a consulting report that is cited
in their decision to adopt HPB for the package bidding segment of the upcoming 700MHz auction (FCC
Public Notice, August 2007).
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Figure 2. Efficiencies and Revenues by Auction Format
SMR (white), HPB2 (light gray), HPB3-odd (medium gray), HPB3-even (dark gray), MPB (black)
4.1. Efficiency
Market efficiency is defined as the value of the allocation obtained in the auction (the
actual surplus, Sactual) divided by the value of the best possible allocation (the maximum
possible surplus, Soptimal):
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efficiency =
Sactual
Soptimal
× 100%. (3)
The summary Table A1 in the Appendix lists average efficiencies across sessions and
auction formats.
Package bidding is designed to help bidders avoid the “exposure problem” of bidding
high for licenses with high complementarities. As expected, switching from SMR to the
package auction formats raises efficiency: from 85.1% to 89.7% for MPB, to 92.1% for
HPB2, and to 92.6% and 94.0% for HPB3-even and HPB3-odd respectively. The left part
of Figure 2 shows average efficiencies across formats: the white bar corresponds to SMR,
the light-gray bar to HPB2, the medium-gray bar to HPB3-odd, the dark-gray bar to
HPB3-even, and the black bar to MPB. The standard deviations are indicated by the
bracketed intervals at the top of each bar. Notice that efficiencies are higher and less
variable under the HPB formats as compared to SMR and MPB.
The performance differences suggested by Figure 2 are supported by a statistical anal-
ysis. As illustrated by Figure 2, the HPB environments yield very similar results (in
terms of efficiency and revenue) and, hence, we will pool the observations from the HPB
13The total number of possible allocations with this setup is 27,433,982.
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environments. Below ∼ indicates a pair-wise ordering that is not significant, Â∗ indicates
significance at the 10% level, Â∗∗ indicates significance at the 5% level, and Â∗∗∗ indicates
significance at the 1% level.
Result 1. Efficiencies are ranked HPB Â∗∗∗ SMR and HPB Â∗ MPB.
Support. See the Appendix for an overview of session averages across auction formats.
There are five averages for SMR and MPB, corresponding to the five value waves, and
fifteen averages for HPB after pooling the HPB environments. The non-parametric test
employed is a Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test. The difference in ranks between
MPB and SMR is 9 (five observations), which is not significant. The difference in ranks
between HPB and MPB is 90 (fifteen observations), which is significant (p = 0.09). Fi-
nally, the difference in ranks between HPB and SMR is 120 (fifteen observations), which
is significant at the one-percent level (p < 0.001). ¤
One cause of efficiency reductions with SMR is the incidence of unsold licenses, which
happens at a rate of 2.1 licenses (out of 18) when averaged over all sessions. Likewise, on
average 1.0 license is unsold under MPB while there are virtually no unsold licenses with
HPB, see Figure 3.
Result 2. The numbers of unsold licenses are ranked SMR ∼ MPB Â∗∗∗ HPB.
Support. The higher rate at which licenses are awarded under HPB is clear from the
right-most set of bars in Figure 3. The difference between HPB and MPB in terms of
license sales rates is significant with a Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test (p < 0.001
with fifteen observations) while the difference between MPB and SMR is (borderline)
insignificant (p = 0.13 with five observations). ¤
4.2. Revenues
Revenues are also normalized by the value of the best possible allocation:
revenue =
Ractual
Soptimal
× 100%. (4)
The introduction of package bidding enhances revenues as shown in the right part of
Figure 2. Switching from SMR to the package auction formats raises revenue from 65.6%
to 70.8% for MPB, to 75.3% for HPB2, and to 76.5% and 77.9% for HPB3-odd and HPB3-
even respectively. As before, these comparisons can be evaluated with a Wilcoxon test
based on the session averages reported in the Appendix.
Result 3. Revenues are ranked HPB Â∗∗∗ MPB Â∗∗ SMR.
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Figure 3. Licenses Acquired by Regional Bidders (1-6), the National Bidder (7),
and the Number of Unsold Licenses. Optimal Awards of Licenses Shown in Yellow.
SMR (white), HPB2 (light gray), HPB3-odd (medium gray), HPB3-even (dark gray), MPB (black)
Support. The difference in ranks between MPB and SMR is 15 (five observations), which
is significant (p = 0.04). The difference in ranks between HPB and MPB is 120 (fifteen
observations), which is significant at the one-percent level (p < 0.001). ¤
The brackets on each of the bars on the right side of Figure 2 indicate the standard
deviations of the revenues across formats. Note that SMR and MPB result in lower and
more variable revenues as compared to HPB. Also, it is apparent from Figure 2 that
the average efficiencies and revenues with only two tiers are slightly lower than for the
three-tier hierarchies. Even though this difference is not significant, it suggests that in
some situations it is important to have enough hierarchy levels to allow small bidders to
compete effectively when they are part of the efficient allocation.
4.3. Bidders’ Profits
Consistent with the definitions of revenue and efficiency, bidders’ profits are normalized
by the value of the best possible allocation:
profits =
∑
i pi
i
actual
Soptimal
× 100%. (5)
This profit is the difference between actual surplus and seller’s revenue, except for SMR
where possible penalties from withdrawing winning bids are recorded separately (see the
Appendix). Rather than simply reporting the profits for the bidders as a group it is
useful to show them by bidder type since this highlights the impact that package bidding
and/or pre-packaging has on different types of bidders. Figure 4 displays bidders’ profits
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Figure 4. Profits for Regional Bidders (1-6) and the National Bidder (7)
SMR (white), HPB2 (light gray), HPB3-odd (medium gray), HPB3-even (dark gray), MPB (black)
by treatment and bidder number, using the same color-coding as in Figure 2. Again, the
standard deviations are indicated by the brackets at the top of each bar.
The ability to bid for combinations allows national bidders to bid high on large pack-
ages and avoid the exposure problem, resulting in positive profits for the national bidder
(7) in the MPB and HPB auctions. In contrast, the national bidder loses money (in all
waves, see the Appendix) when the SMR format is used. These losses are not surprising
given prior results on SMR experiments; they result from the value complementarities
that create an exposure problem for the national bidder. In the experiment, the effects of
negative earnings on individual behavior were mitigated by the fact that bidder roles were
randomly assigned in each auction. The differences in profits for the national bidder are
corroborated by non-parametric tests. In contrast, the differences in profits for regional
bidders (slightly higher under SMR than MPB and HPB) are not significant.
Result 4. The national bidder’s profit is ranked MPB ∼ HPB Â∗∗∗ SMR. The regional
bidders’ profits (as a group) are ranked SMR ∼ MPB ∼ HPB.
Support. For the national bidder’s profit the difference in ranks between HPB and SMR
is 110 (fifteen observations), which is significant (p = 0.004). The difference in ranks be-
tween MPB and HPB is 62 (fifteen observations), which is not significant. For the regional
bidders’ profits the difference in ranks between SMR and MPB is 88 (fifteen observations),
which is (borderline) insignificant (p = 0.11). The difference in ranks between SMR and
MPB is 7 (five observations), which is not significant. ¤
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5. Discussion
5.1. The Exposure Problem in SMR
One reason for the efficiency and revenue advantages conferred by package bidding vis-
a`-vis SMR is apparent from looking at the outcomes of the first four auctions of wave 5
in which the optimal allocation frequently involved awarding large-circle licenses to the
national bidder: 12, 12, 12, and 11 licenses in auctions 1-4 respectively.14 Under SMR,
the numbers of licenses actually obtained by the national bidder in these four auctions
were 7, 2, 5, and 1, which shows that the national bidder was unable to overcome the
exposure problem and obtain large networks even when it was optimal to do so. The
national bidder was much more successful for the package bidding auctions with the same
value draws; the numbers of licenses obtained by the national bidder were 12, 12, 12, and
12 licenses under MPB and HPB3-odd, 12, 12, 12, and 11 under HPB2, and 12, 7, 12, 12
under HPB3-even.
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The effects of exposure are apparent in the first SMR auction of wave 1. The optimal
allocation involved awarding all 12 licenses on the large circle to the national bidder whose
values for the licenses are listed in Table 2 together with the final prices. For all licenses,
the final price exceeded the national bidder’s stand-alone value for the license, and the
total cost (249) was much higher than the sum of the individual values (102). Suppose the
national bidder had conserved all activity up to the final round and was willing to top the
current prices of Table 2, which would involve a minimum expenditure of 285 (= 249+36)
for a national package worth 326 (= 3.2×102). If the other bidders (who all have sufficient
activity to respond) came back with increases of one additional bid increment, the cost of
acquiring the national package would exceed its value. In this case, the national bidder
could not profitably win any of the licenses. An even worse outcome would result when
only some of the regional bidders respond and the national bidder would win a less valuable
subset. For example, suppose the national bidder would win only the high-value EFGH
combination, which, including synergies, is worth 102 = (19 + 17 + 10 + 18) × 1.6, but
would require an expenditure of at least 177 to top the prices listed in Table 2.
14Recall that in wave 5, small bidders enjoy synergies only for licenses acquired from the national circle.
15Performance differences are also apparent in the awards of blocks of licenses to regional bidders.
There were 13 cases where the optimal allocation provided at least 3 of the 4 high-value licenses (E-H)
to bidder 3, the only bidder who had an interest in all of these and could bid on them as a package in
HPB3-odd. Package bidding generally does better in these cases, with overall average efficiency of 85%
for SMR, as compared with 88% for MPB and 93% for HPB. In both package bidding formats, the EFGH
package was sometimes awarded to bidder 3 when it should not have been, but the efficiency consequences
were small and certainly smaller than the consequences of not awarding one or more of these high-value
licenses at all as happened several times with SMR (a total of six cases out of 13, with three of the four
high-value licenses unsold in auction 5 of wave 3).
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License A B C D E F G H I J K L Total
Value 9 5 2 5 19 17 10 18 8 3 3 3 102
Final Price 12 18 3 9 42 60 15 48 12 12 12 6 249
Table 2. National Bidders’ Values and Final Prices for Licenses A–L.
SMR Auction 1 in Wave 1
The national bidder has to evaluate the risk of being “exposed” during the course
of the auction, not just at the end, since decisions to maintain activity are made on a
round-by-round basis. In the experiment, the national bidder gradually lost activity and
was the provisional winner for fewer licenses as the auction proceeded. At the start of
round 8, for example, the national bidder was winning licenses A, C, E, and G with a
combined value of 55 (including synergies) and prices of 9, 3, 24, and 9 respectively for
a total cost of 45. At the start of round 9, the national bidder was only winning license
C because regional bidders raised their bids to 12, 27, and 12 on licenses A, E, and G.
The total cost of acquiring the ACEG combination became 63 and exceeded the value of
55. At this point, the national bidder (rationally) decided to let the activity drop and to
withdraw the provisionally winning bid of 3 on license C since it was worth only 2 to this
bidder.
In this auction, license C remained unsold even though its price fell back to the min-
imum opening bid of 3. The reason is that the two regional bidders (1 and 2) with an
interest in C had low values for it (2 and 4), and had no additional activity above what
they were provisionally winning or actively competing for. More generally, the price fol-
lowing a withdrawal falls back to the second-highest bid for the license, which tends to
be high since most withdrawals occur late in the auction. Bidders who are constrained in
their activity, as is typically the case late in the auction, are often unwilling or unable to
pick up a high-priced unsold unit.
To summarize, unsold licenses in the SMR auctions are a consequence of the interaction
between exposure risk and the limited bid-withdrawal option intended to alleviate this
problem. For example, Brunner et al. (2007) report no unsold licenses in their low-
complementarities treatment without exposure risk, and there are no unsold licenses in
the no-synergy experiment discussed in section 6.2. Banks et al. (2003) report SMR
experiments without withdrawal options, in which case there are no unsold licenses but
bidders incur large losses. These observations also suggest that all licenses are more likely
to be sold when bidders’ value draws are such that the exposure problem is less severe. In
the experiment, there were no unsold licenses in 7 of the SMR auctions. But even for these
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auctions, the average revenue for SMR was 10% lower compared to HPB (69.6% versus
76.5%) while their efficiencies were virtually the same (93.6% versus 93.4%). Finally, the
option to withdraw provisionally winning bids does not protect the national bidder from
losses, see Figure 4.
The reduced performance of SMR in our design with value complementarities corrob-
orates previous results regarding the adverse effects of exposure risk on efficiency and
revenue (e.g. Bykowsky, Cull, and Ledyard, 2000). In addition, our findings suggest that
the SMR procedure is disadvantageous for efficient providers for whom it is essential to
acquire a national license (e.g. a major new entrant).
5.2. The Threshold Problem in MPB
The awarding of national licenses also provides a perspective on why HPB yields higher
revenues and efficiencies than the more flexible package bidding format, MPB. There were
several MPB auctions in which the national bidder won many licenses on the large circle
when it was not optimal to do so, whereas there are relatively few such cases under HPB.
To see how the national bidder was sometimes able to obtain all licenses under fully flexible
package bidding (MPB) even when it was not optimal to do so, consider the round-by-
round results of auction 2 in wave 1, shown in Table 3. The optimal allocation involved
only a single license for the national bidder, but there were only three rounds in which
the national bidder was not the provisional winner on all 12 licenses. In each of these
three rounds, the regional bidders were not able to coordinate a very strong response in
the sense that their provisionally winning bids left numerous provisionally unsold licenses
(5 out of 12 licenses in rounds 3 and 4, and 2 out of 12 licenses in round 21). With fully
flexible bidding, the regional bidders were bidding on “home-made” overlapping packages
that did not “fit” in the sense that the revenue maximizing allocation left unsold licenses,
which made it easier for the national bidder to regain provisional winner status in the
subsequent rounds. In contrast, when HPB was used with the same draws, the regional
bidders were able to effectively block the national bidder, and the resulting efficiency was
10 percentage points higher: 83% in MPB versus 93% in HPB (efficiency was 94% in
HPB2, 95% in HPB3-odd, and 89% in HPB3-even).
Motivated by this example, we focused on rounds in which the national bidder wins
nothing and counted the number of licenses provisionally won by the regional bidders from
the large circle (licenses A-L). The results are shown in Figure 5. Under MPB, the regional
bidders are able to coordinate their bids such that they provisionally win all 12 licenses
only 10% of the time when the national bidder is not winning any licenses. More than
65% of the time they provisionally win 10 licenses or less (out of 12), resulting in prices
for the 12 licenses that can easily be topped by the national bidder. In contrast, under
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Round National Regional Unsold Regional Unsold
1 12 0 0 2 4
2 12 0 0 2 4
3 0 7 5 5 1
4 0 7 5 5 1
5 12 0 0 2 4
6 12 0 0 3 3
7 12 0 0 3 3
8 12 0 0 3 3
9 12 0 0 4 2
10 12 0 0 4 2
11 12 0 0 4 2
12 12 0 0 4 2
13 12 0 0 4 2
14 12 0 0 6 0
15 12 0 0 6 0
16 12 0 0 6 0
17 12 0 0 6 0
18 12 0 0 6 0
19 12 0 0 6 0
20 12 0 0 6 0
21 0 10 2 5 1
22 12 0 0 6 0
23 12 0 0 6 0
Optimal 0 12 0 6 0
National Circle Regional Circle
Table 3. Round-By-Round Outcomes for MPB Auction 2, Wave 1
HPB, the regional bidders are able to coordinate and provisionally win 11 or 12 licenses
more than 95% of the time. Our experiments nicely demonstrate that the threshold
problem we observe with flexible package bidding is not merely a “free-rider” problem
but also a coordination problem – indeed, the latter is more pronounced in our data. To
our knowledge, our paper is the first to clearly demonstrate the existence of a threshold
problem for smaller bidders in auctions with flexible package bidding.
We are not claiming that HPB will yield better performance in terms of efficiency and
revenue in all environments. For instance, if the hierarchical pre-packaging completely
mismatches bidders’ preferences, the resulting exposure problem that all bidders face
would likely reduce bids and revenues. Alternatively, if there is no bidder with an interest
in the national package, mis-coordination would be more easily resolved by regional bid-
ders who would be provisional winners in all rounds. The design of our experiment is based
on the belief that the FCC will be able to craft economically relevant packages for at least
some of the bidders and that there would be one or more bidders (e.g. de novo entrants)
interested in a national package. Furthermore, as the results from treatment HPB3-even
demonstrate, the performance of HPB is robust to some degree of “mis-packaging.” Even
an extremely simple hierarchy structure such as HPB2 leads to improved performance
relative to the other formats. The experiments discussed in the next section provide a
further robustness check in environments with richer sets of value synergies.
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Figure 5. Number of Licenses Regional Bidders Provisionally Win from the Large
National Circle (Licenses A-L) in Rounds Where the National Bidder Wins Nothing
SMR (white), HPB2 (light gray), HPB3-odd (medium gray), HPB3-even (dark gray), MPB (black)
6. Two Follow-Up Experiments
6.1. Complements and Substitutes
The SMR was ideally designed to deal with substitutes since bidders can switch back and
forth between equally desired licenses in response to changes in prices. Substitutes are
likely to play some role when multiple blocks of identically sized bandwidth are sold in the
same regions, as is often the case in spectrum auctions.16 We also tested an alternative
design with 2 separate bands of 6 licenses, with positive synergies for licenses within
a band and negative synergies between bands. The “upper band” consists of licenses
A through F and the “lower band” consists of licenses G through L. Table 4 lists the
synergy factors that can be used to determine the value of any combination of licenses.
The synergy factor in the table is multiplied by the sum of values for the licenses in a
combination. For example, if a bidder wins three licenses within the upper band and no
licenses in the lower band then the column labeled 3 and the row labeled 0 apply. In
this case, the total value for the package equals the sum of the individual values plus an
additional 80%. Likewise, if the bidder wins three licenses in the upper band and two in
the lower band, then the value of the combination is the sum of the values in the upper
16As a matter of theory, it is possible to design simultaneous ascending auctions that converge mono-
tonically to Walrasian package prices in the pure complements case discussed above. This result assumes
“straightforward bidding,” i.e. allocating bidding activity to licenses and packages with the highest profit
margins based on current prices. In practice, bidders typically do not bid straightforwardly (Brunner et
al., 2007). More importantly, the auction would require non-linear pricing, i.e. the price for a package is
not necessarily equal to the sum of the prices for the licenses it contains. As a result, the auctioneer and
bidders would have to keep track of many, many prices (e.g. 262,143 in the experiment reported above).
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1 2 3 4 5 6
0 1.00 1.43 1.80 2.13 2.40 2.63
1 0.95 1.35 1.70 2.00 2.25 2.45
2 0.90 1.28 1.60 1.88 2.10 2.28
3 0.85 1.20 1.50 1.75 1.95 2.10
4 0.80 1.13 1.40 1.63 1.80 1.93
5 0.75 1.05 1.30 1.50 1.65 1.75
6 0.70 0.98 1.20 1.38 1.50 1.58
Licenses Won within the Band
Licenses 
Won in 
the other 
Band
Table 4. Synergy Factors for Licenses Won within a Band
band times 1.6 plus the sum of the values in the lower band times 1.2.
Note that the numbers in Table 4 are increasing within each row to reflect comple-
ments, while substitution effects are captured by the decreasing numbers within each
column. To see how bidders’ valuations are super-additive for some combinations, con-
sider a national bidder who acquires licenses A and B from the upper band. For simplicity,
assume the stand-alone values for the licenses are v(A) = 15 and v(B) = 15, which is the
average over the range [10, 20] used in the experiment. It follows from the the top row
in Table 4 that the combination is worth v(AB) = 43 (calculated as = 1.43× 30), which
exceeds the sum of the individual values: v(AB) > v(A) + v(B). Similarly, the value of
acquiring licenses G and H from the bottom band is 43 on average. Next consider the
value for acquiring the combination ABGH, which is readily calculated as v(ABGH) = 77
(= 1.28 ∗ 60) and is less than the sum of the values of the two combinations from each
line: v(ABGH) < v(AB) + v(GH). The sub-additive nature of bidders’ valuations across
bands is more dramatic for larger combinations of licenses. For example, the value of
winning a combination of 6 licenses from a single band is 236 when each of the 6 licenses
is worth 15 individually. Winning an additional 6 licenses from the other band raises the
total value only to 284, i.e. v(ABCDEFGHIJKL) = v(ABCDEF) + v(GHIJKL)− 188.
Subjects in the experiment did not have to multiply synergy factors times sums of
values. Rather, the jAuctions bidder interface showed the total value (including positive
and/or negative synergies) for all the pre-defined packages and for any “custom” package
of interest. In our HPB treatment, bids could be submitted for individual licenses and for
pre-defined packages (AB, CD, EF and ABCDEF for the upper band and GH, IJ, KL and
GHIJKL for the lower band). Under SMR, no bids could be placed for the pre-defined
packages although bidders could see their values. Under all three auction formats, bidders
could view the values of any desired combination of licenses but only under MPB were
bidders allowed to submit bids for such custom packages.
As before, bidders were assigned roles randomly at the start of each auction, with IDs
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Efficiency Revenue Regional's Profit National's Profit Rounds Unsold
Complementarities Design
SMR 85.1% 65.6% 3.0% -2.6% 17.8 2.1
HPB 93.0% 76.5% 2.4% 1.6% 12.2 0.1
MPB 89.7% 70.8% 2.8% 2.3% 15.1 1.0
Mixed-Synergy Design
SMR 85.4% 78.0% 1.7% 1.1% 15.4 1.5
HPB 93.2% 85.7% 0.7% 2.6% 12.8 0.0
MPB 94.5% 84.6% 1.1% 3.3% 15.3 0.1
No-Synergy Design
SMR 99.4% 77.1% 7.1% 0.4% 5.8 0.0
HPB 99.2% 77.3% 7.0% 0.5% 6.0 0.0
MPB 98.8% 78.3% 6.5% 0.4% 5.8 0.0
Table 5. Summary Statistics for the Three Synergy Designs
1 through 3 for regional bidders and IDs 4 and 5 for national bidders. Regional bidders are
interested in four licenses in each band with values drawn independently from a uniform
distribution on [10, 30].17 National bidders have values for all 6 licenses in each band;
these draws are from a uniform distribution on [10, 20]. These ranges of values were
selected to ensure that the optimal allocations involved awards of a national license in
some but not all auctions. We conducted 6 waves of SMR, MPB and HPB sessions with 6
auctions in each session, using new random draws for each wave. In all auctions, regional
bidders started with an activity limit of 8 and national bidders with an activity limit of
12. Other procedural elements (cash conversion rate, bid increment, common knowledge
of value distributions, subject pool, number of practice periods) were unchanged from the
experiment reported above. One procedural change that we implemented, however, was
that bidders were unable to see the IDs and associated bids made by others (“anonymous
bidding”).
Efficiencies and revenues for this mixed-synergy design are shown in the middle part of
Table 5 (the results for the complementarities treatment are shown in the top part for com-
parison, with pooled results for the different HPB treatments, and the bottom part shows
the results of an experiment discussed in the next subsection). In this mixed-synergy de-
sign, revenue and efficiency increases of roughly 10% were observed when switching from
SMR to HPB, which are about the same magnitude as those observed in the complemen-
tarities design. Again, the improved performance of HPB is accomplished in fewer rounds
on average, as can be seen from the “Rounds” column in Table 5.
Result 5. With mixed synergies, efficiencies are ranked HPB ∼ MPB Â∗∗∗ SMR and
17Bidder 1 values A, B, C, and F in the “upper” A–F band and licenses G, H, I, and L in the “lower”
G–L band. Bidder 2 has values for B, C, D, E and H, I, J, K and bidder 3 has values for A, D, E, F and
G, J, K, L.
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revenues are ranked HPB Â∗∗ SMR and MPB ∼ SMR. The national bidder’s profit is
ranked HPB ∼ MPB Â∗∗∗ SMR while a regional’s profit is ranked HPB ∼ MPB ∼ SMR.
The numbers of unsold licenses are ranked SMR Â∗∗∗ HPB ∼ MPB.
Support. See Table A1 in the Appendix for an overview of session averages across auc-
tion formats. There are six averages for each auction format, corresponding to the six
value waves, which are evaluated using a Wilcoxon matched-pairs sign-rank test. Com-
paring efficiency levels, the difference in ranks between HPB and SMR and between MPB
and SMR is 21 (p = 0.01). Comparing revenue levels, the difference in ranks between
HPB and SMR is 19 (p = 0.04) and between MPB and SMR is 15 (p = 0.17). For the
national bidder’s profit, the difference in ranks between HPB and SMR and between MPB
and SMR is 21 (p = 0.01). For a regional bidder’s profit, the difference in ranks is 13
(p = 0.30) between SMR and HPB and 11 (p = 0.46) between SMR and MPB. Finally,
comparing numbers of unsold licenses the difference in ranks between SMR and HPB and
between SMR and MPB is 21 (p = 0.01). ¤
6.2. No-Synergy Design
A final experiment we ran is based on a no-synergy design with payoffs that are strictly
linear or additive, i.e. v(P1 ∪ P2) = v(P1) + v(P2) for any two packages P1 and P2. This
design can be implemented by replacing all the synergy factors in Table 4 by 1. We
conducted 5 waves of SMR, MPB and HPB sessions using the exact same setup as in the
mixed-synergies design (e.g. two bands, two national bidders and 3 regional bidders, no
information about others’ IDs and bids, etc.). Giving bidders the opportunity to bid on
packages has no adverse effects for efficiency and revenue in the no-synergies design, as
the bottom part of Table 5 shows.
Result 6. Without synergies, efficiencies are near perfect for all three auction formats
and are not significantly different across formats, nor are the revenues, bidders’ profits,
the number of unsold licenses, and the auction’s duration.
Support. See Table A1 for an overview of session averages across formats. There are five
averages for each format, corresponding to the five value waves. Evaluating differences
with a Wilcoxon test reveals that none are significant at the 10% level. ¤
7. Conclusion
In this paper we investigate how the constrained structure of hierarchical package bid-
ding (HPB) compares with alternatives that involve flexible package bidding (MPB) or no
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package bidding (SMR). The design entails an environment with value complementarities,
which are likely significant for de novo entrants wishing to establish a national footprint.
In addition, the design features a “spike” of adjacent high-value licenses, which introduces
an asymmetry that exaggerates the threshold problem. Since different blocks of spectrum
within the same region may be considered substitutes, we conducted two additional ex-
periments: one with a stylized model that incorporates both complements and substitutes
and the other one without any synergy effects. Within this general modeling framework,
we used sets of randomly generated values that induce a wide range of possible market
structures.
With complementarities, the results of the laboratory auctions reveal a clear advantage
for HPB even though the pre-made packages allowed under HPB did not match the
preferred packages for half of the regional bidders (while those bidders were part of the
optimal assignment). HPB yields significantly higher auction revenues and efficiencies
than SMR and MPB for all pairwise comparisons. Comparable improvements in revenues
and efficiencies of HPB over SMR were observed in the mixed-synergy design, while the
relative performance of HPB was not significantly reduced in the no-synergy design. These
performance differences were not due to increased fine-tuning over a large number of
bidding rounds, since the HPB auctions actually tended to have fewer rounds.
The lower efficiencies and revenues observed for SMR in the presence of value comple-
mentarities could have been anticipated from prior work. The option of withdrawing bids
in SMR, which was introduced as a partial remedy of the exposure problem, generated
a higher incidence of unsold licenses compared to the other auction formats. Previous
experiments that did not allow bid withdrawals resulted in fewer or no unsold licenses,
but there the effects of exposure risk are indicated by the low efficiencies and the negative
earnings observed. And in our experiments, even in those cases where no license went
unsold, SMR yields less revenue than HPB.
What came as a surprise was the relative ranking of HPB and the more flexible MPB.18
One factor that contributed to this difference is that the home-made packages constructed
under the flexible MPB format tended to overlap, causing a “fitting problem” that made
it difficult for strong regional bidders to unseat a national package bid. Indeed, the
number of licenses awarded to the national bidder was much higher than the optimal
number under MPB, but not under HPB and SMR. More importantly, in rounds when
the national bidder won nothing, regional bidders were unable to coordinate their bids
under MPB while their coordination problems were virtually non-existent with pre-defined
18In an interesting recent contribution, Milgrom (2007) shows how limiting bidders’ strategy spaces
in combinatorial auctions, as in our HPB design, can eliminate certain undesirable (low-efficiency, low-
revenue) outcomes.
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hierarchically-structured packages. Pre-packaging has the obvious disadvantage that the
chosen packages may not be optimal, but in a non-overlapping hierarchical structure they
are chosen to “fit,” which enables bidders to coordinate their bids and avoid threshold
problems with positive effects for efficiencies and revenues.
Combining results from the three synergy designs provides a clear picture. The SMR
auction, which has been used by the FCC for more than a decade (and copied by similar
regulatory agencies around the world), performs well in the linear environment it was
designed for. But so does the HPB auction, whose simple assignment and pricing rules
reduce to those of the SMR auction when the absence of synergies results in license-by-
license competition. Moreover, when bidders are interested in aggregating combinations of
licenses to build a regional or national network, the HPB auction significantly outperforms
SMR. It enables efficient de novo entrants to establish a national footprint, a level of
aggregation that is virtually impossible under the commonly used SMR format due to
exposure risk.
The adverse effects of exposure risk are not just of academic concern – they played
an important role in the design of the upcoming 700MHz auction. The current wireless
industry is highly concentrated and the 700MHz auction provides the last opportunity for
a new firm to enter the market. For an entrant to be successful in the wireless market,
however, it has to acquire a nationwide footprint. The solution to this important market
design problem is to allow for package bidding. But package auctions can be complex and
can result in coordination or “threshold” problems for smaller bidders (as our MPB data
indicate). While package auctions have been discussed for more than a decade, the FCC
never adopted any of the existing formats due to concerns about complexity.
The hierarchical package bidding format proposed here is a ‘paper & pencil’ package
auction: trivial to implement with assignment and pricing rules that are transparent and
easily verifiable by bidders as the auction proceeds. The predefined packages are chosen
to fit, thereby eliminating coordination problems. Of course, one has to be careful in
generalizing the relative performance of HPB to other environments. But the experiments
show that its improved performance is robust to some degree of package misspecification
and occurs even for a simple two-layer hierarchy with a single nationwide license. HPB is
a prime example of “economic engineering,” i.e. the combination of applied mechanism
design with wind-tunnel laboratory testing. It offers a simple and transparent solution to
a complex market design problem, and puts economic research right at the heart of the
FCC’s most important auction to date.
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Appendix A: Summary Data Table
SMR HPB2 HPB3-odd HPB3-even MPB SMR HPB MPB SMR HPB MPB
Efficiency
Wave 1 88.5% 90.0% 92.4% 91.5% 88.7% 89.1% 92.8% 96.8% 99.6% 99.3% 99.9%
Wave 2 91.3% 92.0% 94.6% 92.4% 86.6% 89.0% 92.2% 94.2% 99.4% 99.4% 97.2%
Wave 3 80.2% 88.3% 94.6% 92.0% 89.0% 73.9% 91.8% 96.0% 99.4% 99.9% 99.6%
Wave 4 81.9% 94.5% 92.4% 92.3% 86.1% 87.5% 97.9% 90.6% 98.9% 99.5% 99.7%
Wave 5 83.8% 95.8% 96.0% 94.8% 98.2% 85.2% 89.9% 95.1% 99.5% 97.7% 97.4%
Wave 6 87.7% 94.4% 94.0%
Average 85.1% 92.1% 94.0% 92.6% 89.7% 85.4% 93.2% 94.5% 99.4% 99.2% 98.8%
Revenue
Wave 1 67.3% 79.0% 71.9% 81.5% 70.3% 81.2% 83.2% 88.7% 77.5% 76.9% 79.7%
Wave 2 64.2% 73.2% 76.8% 77.2% 65.3% 77.1% 84.9% 80.1% 74.4% 76.5% 74.1%
Wave 3 65.5% 74.0% 77.0% 73.5% 71.9% 65.1% 86.1% 86.6% 76.9% 75.1% 76.2%
Wave 4 62.1% 72.6% 78.7% 78.7% 71.0% 79.6% 90.1% 88.1% 76.8% 75.8% 77.5%
Wave 5 68.6% 77.5% 77.9% 77.3% 75.5% 81.9% 86.9% 84.4% 80.1% 82.2% 84.0%
Wave 6 83.3% 82.7% 79.7%
Average 65.6% 75.3% 76.5% 77.7% 70.8% 78.0% 85.7% 84.6% 77.1% 77.3% 78.3%
Penalties 4.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Profit Nationals
Wave 1 -1.3% -0.2% 0.8% -2.6% 1.7% 2.3% 4.2% 2.5% 0.8% 0.7% 0.6%
Wave 2 -0.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 0.1% 2.9% 4.1% 4.0% 0.3% 0.3% 0.7%
Wave 3 -4.5% 0.1% -0.7% -0.4% 1.2% 0.9% 2.8% 2.1% 0.2% 0.4% 0.2%
Wave 4 -3.9% 0.8% -0.3% 2.0% 0.3% 1.2% 1.8% 2.1% 0.3% 0.5% 0.3%
Wave 5 -2.3% 9.9% 8.4% 6.5% 8.3% -1.9% -0.5% 3.4% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4%
Wave 6 1.4% 3.4% 5.4%
Average -2.6% 2.1% 1.6% 1.1% 2.3% 1.1% 2.6% 3.3% 0.4% 0.5% 0.4%
Profit Regionals
Wave 1 3.0% 1.8% 3.3% 2.1% 2.8% 1.1% 0.4% 1.1% 6.8% 7.0% 6.3%
Wave 2 4.4% 3.0% 3.0% 2.4% 3.6% 2.1% -0.3% 2.1% 8.1% 7.4% 7.2%
Wave 3 2.0% 2.3% 3.0% 3.1% 2.6% 2.4% 0.0% 1.8% 7.3% 8.0% 7.7%
Wave 4 2.8% 3.6% 2.3% 1.9% 2.5% 1.8% 1.4% -0.6% 7.2% 7.5% 7.2%
Wave 5 2.6% 1.5% 1.6% 1.8% 2.4% 2.4% 1.3% 1.3% 6.3% 4.9% 4.2%
Wave 6 0.5% 1.6% 1.1%
Average 3.0% 2.4% 2.6% 2.2% 2.8% 1.7% 0.7% 1.1% 7.1% 7.0% 6.5%
Unsold Licenses
Wave 1 2.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 1.2 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Wave 2 1.5 0.0 0.2 0.0 1.8 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Wave 3 2.7 0.3 0.3 0.0 1.2 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Wave 4 2.7 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.5 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
Wave 5 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Wave 6 1.0 0.0 0.0
Average 2.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 1.0 1.5 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
# Rounds
Wave 1 20.0 11.5 8.8 12.0 20.2 11.8 13.5 15.8 4.8 6.0 4.5
Wave 2 18.0 13.2 16.7 13.8 14.0 17.8 13.8 14.3 6.5 5.8 6.2
Wave 3 17.0 13.0 12.7 12.0 15.3 20.0 11.3 15.2 7.5 6.2 6.7
Wave 4 19.5 8.5 14.5 14.8 16.3 11.7 12.3 11.0 4.0 6.3 4.7
Wave 5 14.5 8.0 13.3 10.0 9.7 14.3 15.3 19.8 6.3 5.8 6.7
Wave 6 16.8 10.7 15.5
Average 17.8 10.8 13.2 12.5 15.1 15.4 12.8 15.3 5.8 6.0 5.8
Complementarities Design Mixed-Synergy Design No-Synergy Design
Table A1. Average Performance Measures by Session and Treatment
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